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Abstract
Although fine art is becoming increasingly popular as investment, its price determination is relatively opaque.
This paper expands upon the work of Pesando (1993) and Pesando and Shum (2007) concerning the law of
one price in the art auction industry. By examining the sale history of silkscreen prints from Andy Warhol’s
1970 series Flowers, this paper controls for the physical characteristics of particular artwork and seeks to
determine the likelihood of sale and price differentials created by specific auction environments. This paper
further examines the extent to which auction houses take into account these auction environments when
setting presale price estimates, as well as how correlated these estimates are to the final realized price of a
work. The results suggest that significant factors impacting likelihood of sale and final realized price for a work
include the average price of the total sale it was included in—indicative of spillover effects from other works in
the sale. The results also suggest that on some level, auction houses set presale estimates strategically, based on
factors aside from market trends and the inherent quality and condition of the work. Larger, more established
houses are likely more strategic at setting estimates—valuing lower to increase the probability of sale.
Keywords
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I. Introduction  
 
 In May of 1998, Orange Marilyn, one in a series of five almost identical prints by pop 
artist Andy Warhol sold for a record $17.3 million at auction at Sotheby’s New York. Not only 
was this price four times the record for a Warhol piece at the time, but also more than three times 
the price of a slightly different Orange Marilyn available for sale at the same time through a 
private dealer. Only a few days after the sale, a slightly smaller Orange Marilyn sold for $3 
million.1 These disparate prices seem to be in blatant violation of the law of one price, which 
assumes that in the absence of transaction costs or regulatory barriers, no price differences 
should exist for identical goods.2 
 The private dealer market is inherently obscure, with very little information publicly 
available—making generalizations within the private sales market, and between the private sales 
and auction market almost impossible. Yet within the sensational and extravagant world of fine 
art auctions, similar examples of price dispersion abound. This paper seeks to study the effects of 
the auction environment in which works are sold on their likelihood of sale and final realized 
price. Unique physical characteristics of works will be controlled for by restricting the sample to 
silkscreen prints, which will be assumed to be identical.3 This paper also seeks to examine the 
extent to which auction houses take into account the auction environments they create when 
setting presale price estimates, and how accurate these estimates are at predicting realized prices. 
                                                        
1
 Thompson, Donald N. The $ 12 Million Stuffed Shark: The Curious Economics of 
Contemporary Art and Auction Houses. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Print. 
2
 The range of transactions costs that could occur in the art market, such as different taxing 
schemes or the costs of international shipping, is quite small and hence is assumed to have 
minimal effect on buyer behavior. All final realized prices mentioned in this paper are exclusive 
of taxes or shipping costs.  
3
 Screen printing is a technique in which a desired image is transferred from a stencil onto a 
medium, such as paper, canvas, or wood. 
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Ultimately, it is hoped that these findings will have implications for the strategic choices made 
by both buyers and sellers of art, including those who seek art as an investment asset. 
 This paper will proceed as follows: Section II provides a general overview of the fine art 
auction market and the mechanics of auctions. Section III reviews relevant literature on fine art 
as investment, auctions, and the fine art auction market more specifically.  Section IV describes 
the sample of prints chosen, the dataset collected, and the variables examined. Section V 
explains the empirical methodology utilized, while Section VI highlights econometric results. 
Section VII examines potential sources of error, and finally Section VIII provides concluding 
remarks and areas for further study.  
 
II. Overview of Art Auctions 
The Market 
 The fine art auction market is considered by most to be a duopoly. The oldest and most 
prominent auction houses are Sotheby’s, founded in 1744, and Christie’s, founded in 1766. 
Together, the two houses control almost 90% of the global secondary art market today.45 In a tier 
below exist Phillips and Bonhams, both globally reaching auction houses, yet considered clearly 
secondary to Christie’s and Sotheby’s. These medium auction houses hold about 5% and 1% of 
the market respectively today.6 In recent years, these two houses have been increasingly steering 
away from direct competition with Christie’s and Sotheby’s and instead seeking out niche 
                                                        
4
 The secondary market is comprised of works that are resold, whereas the primary market is 
comprised of works that are sold directly from the artist. 
5
 McAndrew, Clare. TEFAF Art Market Report 2015: The Global Art Market, With a Focus on 
the U.S. and China. Rep. Maastricht: European Fine Art Foundation, 2015. Print. 
6
 Ibid.  
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markets—such as ultra-contemporary art.7 Finally, numerous small regional and local auction 
houses exist, each controlling less than 1% of the market. 
 The traditional large art auction markets are New York, London, and Paris. In the last 
decade, emerging markets, particularly in Asia, have rapidly become important art markets as 
their population of ultra high net worth individuals increases. China, in 2014, was tied with the 
United Kingdom as the second largest art market in the world by value, with 22% of the 
market—while the United States was the largest with 39% of the market. In 2011, China even 
briefly overtook the United States as the world’s largest art market.8 The most important and 
prestigious sales, largely held by the major auction houses, occur in the spring and fall months, 
whereas major art fairs occur in winter and summer months.  
 
Auction Mechanics   
Individuals and institutions with works they wish to sell approach, or in some cases—
such as after the death of a famous or prolific collector—are approached by an auction house or 
auction houses. Negotiations over auction aspects as well as commission charged to the seller 
occur, and the seller agrees to sell through a specific auction house. Auction houses earn their 
revenue by charging commissions to both sellers and buyers of work. The seller’s commission is 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis, and is usually quoted as a percentage of the hammer price, as 
the winning bid at auction is known. In some cases, such as with famous works or collections 
that have the potential of producing great media attention and attracting high profile and high net 
worth bidders, the seller’s commission is waved and the auction house may even guarantee a 
                                                        
7
 Thompson, Donald N. 
8
 Ibid.  
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minimum sale price.9 Auction houses set fixed buyer’s premiums on a sliding scale for every 
work sold by the house in a particular market. For example, at Christie’s New York in 2014, 
buyer’s paid a 25% premium on the first $100,000 of the hammer price, 20% on the amount 
from $100,001 to $2,000,000, and 12% on the amount above $2,000,000. Buyer’s premiums are 
similar across auction houses, and have fluctuated since their introduction in 1975.10 
Prior to 1995, Christie’s and Sotheby’s engaged in fierce competition for consignments 
through negotiating favorable seller’s commissions, offering price guarantees, and other 
methods. This competition suddenly ended in 1995 when both houses announced fixed, 
nonnegotiable sliding-scale commissions.  In 2000, an antitrust investigation revealed a price 
fixing scandal between executives of Christie’s and Sotheby’s. The two firms were accused of 
colluding to raise seller’s commissions and stealing more than $400 million between 1993 and 
1999.11 In September 2001, Christie’s and Sotheby’s settled a class-action civil suit, agreeing to 
each pay a total of $256 million that could be claimed by anyone who had bought or sold from 
the houses since 1993. Alfred Taubman, Sotheby’s Chairman of the Board at the time, served 10 
months in prison in 2002.12 Since the conclusion of the price-fixing scheme, this paper assumes 
that auction houses fairly compete for consignments. 
Before an auction, auction houses publish glossy, visually appealing pre-sale catalogues 
detailing information on the works up for sale. This includes photographic reproduction of the 
work, its title, artist, year of creation, medium, size, and provenance—or prior ownership and 
sale history. In addition, auction houses publish both a low and high price estimate for the 
                                                        
9 Ibid.  
10 Horowitz, Noah. Art of the Deal: Contemporary Art in a Global Financial Market. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton UP, 2011. Print. 
11 "Ex-Sotheby's Boss Convicted." CNN. Cable News Network, 5 Dec. 2001. Web. 31 Jan. 2014. 
12 "Christie's and Sotheby's: What an Art." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 05 Aug. 
2004. Web. 31 Jan. 2014. 
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hammer price of the work. Auction estimates are purported by auction houses to reflect “rarity, 
condition, quality and provenance” and are “based on prices recently paid at auction for 
comparable property.”13  Works are also featured in pre-sale exhibitions, and important, highly 
sought after works often travel to different markets to be viewed by potential buyers. 
 Art auctions themselves operate as English auctions—in other words, ascending price 
auctions. The first work offered for sale is assigned a lot number of 1 and lot numbers ascend 
until the last work offered in a particular auction. Auctioneers start with low prices and call out 
increasingly high prices until the work is sold at the hammer price. The final price for each work 
and the total sale sum published in post-sale results by most auction houses is the final realized 
price inclusive of the hammer price and the buyer’s premiums. All works offered for sale have a 
undisclosed reserve price, agreed upon by the seller and the auction house. If bidding does not 
reach the reserve price, the work will go unsold and is referred to as “bought in.” Although 
reserve prices are never revealed, research shows that reserve prices are around 70% of the low 
estimate quoted by the auction house.14 Auction houses are eager to conceal items that have 
failed to sell at auction. Beginning with legislation enacted in the early 1980s in New York, 
auction houses have been obliged to announce during the auction whether a sale has occurred.15 
However, information on sales is still difficult to garner from published post-sale auction results, 
as will be discussed in further detail in Section IV.  
 
 
                                                        
13 "Guide to Buying & Bidding." Christie's, n.d. Web. 
14
 Ashenfelter, Orley, and Kathryn Graddy. "Sale Rates and Price Movements in Art Auctions." 
American Economic Review 101.3 (2011): 212-16. Web. 
15
 Ashenfelter, Orley, and Kathryn Graddy. "Auctions and the Price of Art." Journal of Economic 
Literature 41.3 (2003): 763-86. Web. 
5
Liu: Art Arbitrage
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2015
 Liu, 6
III. Literature Review 
 Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003) provide a thorough overview of the mechanics of art 
auctions and the business of auction houses, as well as a survey of the economic research done 
on the field. Unsurprisingly, much of the literature on the market is focused on the returns of art 
purchased as investment.    
 
Price Indices 
 The most common research models for assessing art price and price indices have been 
hedonic and repeat-sale models, which are used extensively in real estate valuation. Both models 
assume that the price of a given work at auction at a given time is the aggregate of a fixed 
component of price that reflects the unique quality of the work, an index of aggregate price 
movements, and an error term.16  While the hedonic model assumes the fixed component is 
determined by a number of hedonic variables, the repeat-sale model controls for these variables 
explicitly by only analyzing works that were resold during the given time period at the expense 
of discarding data for works that did not resell. Although the hedonic model allows for the use of 
all of the data in a certain time period, it assumes that a small set of variables captures much of 
the variability in price, and the characteristics of works sold does not vary greatly over time. An 
example of some of the work done with these models include Chanel et al. (1996), which uses a 
sample of paintings from 1855-1969 and find real returns of 4.9% and 5.0% from the hedonic 
and repeat-sales methods respectively. Mei and Moses (2001) use a sample of American, 
Impressionist, and Old Masters works from 1875-2000 and find real returns of 4.9% from the 
repeat-sales methods.  Higgs and Worthington (2005) take a closer look at the Australian art 
market from 1973-2003, and find returns of 7% using the hedonic model. Closer examination of 
                                                        
16
 Ibid. 
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their hedonic characteristics also lead them to conclude that prices are higher for works painted 
by certain artists and deceased artists, executed in oil or acrylic, or auctioned at Sotheby’s and 
Christie’s. While many, such as Goetzmann (1993) and Korteweg, Kraussl, and Verwijmeren 
(2013), have used CAPM models to conclude that the returns on fine art are less than those on 
traditional long-term investments given the market’s riskiness, I hope my research will be able to 
provide clarity on strategic decisions that command higher prices at auction, and ultimately have 
implications for the choices made by both buyers and sellers of fine art with the goal of 
maximizing investment potential. 
 
 
Law of One Price 
 The bulk of this research builds upon the existing literature on violations of the law of 
one price in the art auction industry done by Pesando (1993) and Pesando and Shum (2007). 
Pesando and Shum (2007), revisiting the results of Pesando (1993), test the law of one price 
using realized prices for all Picasso prints, as well as the 100 prints that make up Picasso’s 
Vollard Suite, sold at auction worldwide between 1977-2004. To compare sales at Christie’s 
with those at Sotheby’s, and sales in the U.S. with those in Europe, they identify pairs of 
identical prints sold within a 30 day window and calculate the percentage of prices realized in the 
first auction house or market that are higher than those in the second, the mean difference in 
price divided by the mean price, and the mean absolute price difference divided by the mean 
price. They find that during the period 1977-1992, prices are 9% less on average at Christie’s 
than at Sotheby’s, significant at a 5% level. During the period 1993-2004, prices were 12% 
higher on average at Christie’s than Sotheby’s, significant at a 5% level. For the entire sample 
period, prices were higher in U.S. markets than Europe. Mei and Moses (2002) test these results 
7
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using repeat-sales data and find mixed evidence of price differences between the two auction 
houses. 
 My research will expand upon Pesando’s findings of these violations by focusing further 
on specific aspects of the auction experience, such as the declining price anomaly explored by 
Beggs and Graddy (1997) and other variables detailed in Section IV.  
 
Declining Price Anomaly 
 While previous work on price had attributed fixed effects to inherent characteristics of 
the work, such as artist, canvas size, and medium, Beggs and Graddy (1997) is the first to 
analyze the effects of the structure of the art auction by empirically testing the declining price 
anomaly. The declining price anomaly occurs when identical items sold sequentially at auction 
follow a declining pattern of realized prices. They examine the order of lots at auction in relation 
to the final hammer price for a sample of Contemporary art and a sample of Impressionist and 
Modern Art.  Their theoretical model shows that ordering a sale from highest to lowest value is 
an optimal strategy for an auction house. The results of their empirical analysis show that both 
estimates and price realized relative to the average auction estimate is less for items that appear 
later in auctions. This declining price anomaly has also been observed by Ashenfelter (1989) and 
McAfee and Vincent (1993) in wine auctions and Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) in 
condominiums sold in real estate auctions. My research will test for the declining price anomaly 
by examining lot placement as a hedonic characteristic of price. 
 
Auction Estimates 
 A number of papers have researched the accuracy of auction estimates and have reached 
divided conclusions. Theoretical literature, such as that of Milgrom and Weber (1982a) show 
8
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that the best policy for auction houses is to provide accurate estimates based on the value of the 
work. Ashenfelter (1989) and Abowd and Ashefelter (1988) find that auction houses are truthful, 
and that the average of the high and low estimate is highly correlated with the final realized 
price. However, others, such as Bauwens and Ginsburgh (2000) and Beggs and Grady (1997) 
find systematic over and under estimations. Bauwens and Ginsburgh (2000) also conclude that 
experts do not fully take into account all of the information contained within the auction 
catalogue, implying that prediction bias could be ameliorated with better use of the hedonic 
characteristics published in the catalogues.  
A possible explanation is that auction experts are inefficient at using all available 
information and make systematic errors. Anecdotal evidence provided by the trials in the 
Christie’s and Sotheby’s price-fixing scandal suggests another possible explanation—strategic 
manipulation of estimates to impact realized prices.17 While executives of the auction houses 
denied involving valuation experts in price-fixing activities, Mei and Moses (2002) find that both 
Sotheby’s and Christie’s have a persistent upward bias in their estimates for the purpose of 
increasing realized prices. This paper seeks to test the correlation between presale estimates and 
final realized prices, as well as the possibility that auction house experts strategically set 
estimates by taking into account the variables detailed in Section IV.  
 
IV. Explanation of Dataset and Variables 
 The sample used in this study is comprised of the sale history of Andy Warhol’s 1970 
print series Flowers, featured on the title page of this paper. This specific series was chosen for a 
number of reasons. Warhol’s work focused on themes of commercialism and mass production, 
                                                        
17 Ibid. 
9
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and hence his studio, which he dubbed his “factory,” was prolific at producing prints for mass 
distribution and sale, just like the everyday objects they often represented. As a result, there exist 
many prints to examine. Research on art market trends also considers the market for Warhol 
works an indicator for the Post-War and Contemporary art market as a whole. Since 2002, 
Warhol has consistently been among the top three most traded artists by value.18  As seen in 
Chart 1, market movements for Warhol’s work closely mirrors that of the top 25 Impressionist, 
Modern, and Contemporary artists.  
Furthermore, unlike the Old Masters prints, where the quality and coloration of each print 
is highly important for its valuation and its price on the market, Warhol’s focus on mass 
production leaves us with prints that are meant to be as identical in quality and price as 
possible.19 Although the Flowers prints come in ten different color variations, their depiction of a 
rather uncontroversial subject also serves to stabilize their price against collectors who may be 
passionate about certain celebrities or events. 
  In total, Warhol’s studio produced 250 editions of each of the ten color variations, as 
well as 26 artist’s proofs.20 A dataset on their sales was manually constructed using price data 
contained in ArtNet’s price database. Information provided by ArtNet includes price, sale date, 
sale location, auction house, lot number, estimates, and any descriptions of provenance and 
physical condition of the work. The rest of the variables in the data set were obtained by 
referencing archived auction catalogues and results published online by auction houses, as well 
as directly contacting auction houses. The first observation occurs in 1989 and the data set 
                                                        
18
 "The Pop Master's Highs and Lows." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 28 Nov. 
2009. Web. 
19
 Based on the expert opinion of Professor Alfred Acres from the Georgetown University 
Department of Art and Art History, who specializes in the history of prints. 
20
 Warhol, Andy, and Michael Lobel. Andy Warhol Flowers. New York: Eykyn Maclean, 2012. 
Print. 
10
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extends through the end of 2014 for a total of 212 observations. All prices and estimates have 
been multiplied by the CPI so that all observations are in 2014 dollars. 
A number of variables will be examined both as dependent and independent variables in 
the equations modeled. Sold is a dummy variable representing whether the work was sold or 
bought in. The variable PricePremium represents the final realized price of the work, inclusive of 
the buyer’s premium at the time of sale. While the buyer’s premium differs by auction house, it 
is assumed that buyers should take into account buyer’s premium and adjust their bids 
accordingly. Most published estimates by the auction houses do not include buyer’s premiums, 
whereas in most cases, reported final prices of individual works and total sale sums do include 
buyer’s premiums. This serves to inflate auction houses’ reporting of their results. For example, 
houses can report that a certain number of works in a sale sold for higher than their estimates, 
where the final reported price includes buyer’s premiums and the estimates did not.21 To correct 
for this, final realized prices are multiplied by one minus the buyer’s premium to obtain the 
variable PriceHammer. The variable AverageEstimate is determined by averaging the low and 
high estimates provided by the auction house.  
 The first hedonic characteristic examined is lot order, in order to test for the declining 
price anomaly. It is represented by a continuous variable determined by dividing the work’s lot 
number by the total lots offered in a sale. If the declining price anomaly holds, when regressed 
against realized price, the coefficient of this variable should be negative, as works that come up 
later in auction should fetch lower prices.  
 Another characteristic of auction environments studied is the sale rate of the total sale. 
The variable for sale rate is a continuous variable determined by dividing the number of lots sold 
                                                        
21 Rosenbaum, Lee. "Making Sales Look Stronger." Wall Street Journal, 15 Nov. 2008. Web. 
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by the total number of lots offered for sale. Because information on unsold lots is often omitted 
from auction house public records, in many cases the total number of lots offered was 
determined by examining archived auction catalogues and pre-sale press. It is hypothesized that 
when regressed against likelihood of sale and realized price, the coefficient on this variable 
should be negative, as having a high number of lots unsold will weaken buyer confidence in the 
sale. 
 Furthermore, it is anticipated that there exist spillover effects from expensive and well-
known works that are included in the sale—as they attract a higher caliber of buyers to bid up the 
price of all the lots offered. These spillover effects are represented by a variable for the average 
price of the sale—a continuous variable determined by dividing the total sale sum (net of the 
Flowers print), inclusive of buyer’s premium, by the number of lots sold.  It is hypothesized that 
when regressed against likelihood of sale and realized price, the coefficient will be positive. 
 A number of dummy variables are introduced to examine fixed effects. A group of 
dummy variables represent the caliber of auction house, using small auction houses as a 
reference group. Medium will represent Bonhams and Phillips de Pury, while Major will 
represent Christie’s and Sotheby’s. Another group of dummy variables represent the type of sale 
the work is included in. Using general sales (sales that include fine and decorative arts, as well as 
sculpture and design) as a reference group, it will include dummies Prints to represent sales of 
Prints and Multiples, and IMC to represent sales of Impressionist, Modern, or Contemporary art 
(or combinations of those styles). Dummy variables Emerging and Traditional represent 
emerging markets (Shanghai, Seoul, Tokyo, Hong Kong) and major traditional art markets (New 
York, London, Paris), using minor markets as a reference. The dummy variable Evening 
represents evening sales, using day sales as a reference. It is hypothesized that evening sales will 
12
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have a larger positive effect on price, as evening sales are considered more prestigious events 
and often require tickets and cocktail or black tie attire. The dummy variable PeakMonth 
represents spring and fall months, when major auction houses hold their biggest sales, using 
winter and summer months as a reference. Finally, dummy variables for year are included, using 
Year 1 (1989) as a reference. 
 A variable that was intended for study was the existence of good provenance, such as 
being owned by a famous collector, celebrity, or museum. In the industry, provenance is widely 
believed to be a major determining factor of a work’s popularity at sale. While provenance is an 
aspect that is publicized and highlighted to potential buyers in auction catalogues, for this sample 
of prints, very few works had provenances significant enough to be mentioned. Therefore, this 
variable was excluded. 
 
V. Empirical Methodology  
 As seen by the summary of variables in Table 1, missing data exists for the LotOrder, 
SaleRate, and AverageEstimate variables, making for a total of 190 complete observations after 
listwise deletion. This results from an unwillingness of some auction houses to disclose sale 
information. Because the missing data is random, the multiple imputation method, developed by 
Rubin (1987) was used to fill in missing variables in the incomplete observations.22 Multiple 
imputation is a Monte Carlo technique where missing values are replaced with average outcomes 
across m simulated versions. A summary of imputation results for m = 0 (before imputation), m
＝ 1, and m =20 is provided in Table 2. 
                                                        
22
 Rubin, Donald B. Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys. New York: Wiley, 1987. 
Print. 
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 The first equation estimated tests the effects of the auction environment on the likelihood 
that a work sells. The below equation is estimated with a logit model, where a coding of 1 for 
Sold indicates that the work sold and a coding of 0 indicates that the work was bought in.  
 
Equation 1: 
 
 
Soldit = Β1 + Β2LotOrderit + Β3 SaleRateit + Β4ln(AveragePrice)it + Β5ln(AverageEstimate) 
+δ1Mediumit + δ2Majorit  + δ3Printsit + δ4IMCit + δ5Eveningit +  δ6Emergingit + δ7Traditionalit + 
δ8PeakMonthit + γ1(PeakMonth x Emerging)it  + γ2(PeakMonth x Traditional)it + εit 
 
 The year dummy variables are excluded in this model because the small number of 
observations for some years led to their omission. The PeakMonth dummy and dummies for 
location of sale are interacted to take into account travel schedules of buyers, as major sales 
usually take place in traditional art markets as well as some big emerging markets in recent 
years. As a result, spring and fall sales are hypothesized to be more important in major market 
locations where buyers will plan to travel for sales, and less important in smaller markets.  
 The second equation regresses the effects of the auction environment on the final realized 
price of the work, inclusive of buyer’s premium.23 The below equation only examines work that 
were sold. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
23 The final realized price inclusive of buyer’s premium, as opposed to the hammer price, is used 
because it is price published by the majority of auction houses. Most data on total sale sum, and 
hence also the AveragePrice variable, is also inclusive of buyer’s premiums.  
14
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 12 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol12/iss1/5
 Liu, 15
 
Equation 2: 
 
 
ln(PricePremium)it = Β1 + Β2LotOrderit + Β3 SaleRateit + Β4ln(AveragePrice)it + δ1Mediumit + 
δ2Majorit  + δ3Printsit + δ4IMCit + δ5Eveningit +  δ6Emergingit + δ7Traditionalit + δ8PeakMonthit 
+ γ1(PeakMonth x Emerging)it  + γ2(PeakMonth x Traditional)it  + δ9Year2it + ….δ30Year22 + εit 
 
 The predictor variables in this equation are the same as those in Equation 1, with the 
omission of the AverageEstimate variable. This paper seeks to study the possibility that auction 
houses strategically set estimates based on factors beyond the inherent value of the work. 
Therefore, if auction houses themselves take into account the predictor variables when setting 
estimates, including the AverageEstimate would introduce issues of endogeneity.  
 The third equation tests the possibility of strategic estimate setting by regressing elements 
of the auction environment against the average of the low and high estimate. 
 
Equation 3:  
 
 
ln(AverageEstimate)it = Β1 + Β2LotOrderit + Β3 SaleRateit + Β4ln(AveragePrice)it + δ1Mediumit 
+ δ2Majorit  + δ3Printsit + δ4IMCit + δ5Eveningit +  δ6Emergingit + δ7Traditionalit + 
δ8PeakMonthit + γ1(PeakMonth x Emerging)it  + γ2(PeakMonth x Traditional)it  + δ9Year2it + 
….δ30Year22 + εit 
 
 The final equation models the relationship between the average estimate and the hammer 
price of the work for works that sold in order to test the predictive ability of auction house 
estimates.  
 
15
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Equation 4:  
ln(PriceHammer)it = Β1 + Β2ln(AverageEstimate)it  + εit 
 
Potential Endogeneity 
 A number of variables tested in the above models could suffer from issues of endogeneity 
and reverse causality. If auction houses follow the optimal strategy theorized by Beggs and 
Graddy (1997) and order sales strategically from highest to lowest value, the result for LotOrder 
could be affected. It is possible that a certain print has unobservable quality or condition flaws 
not captured by the data, or is not expected to be in high demand in a certain sale, and hence is 
assigned a high lot number by the auction houses. In this case, reverse causality could be present, 
such that it is not the high lot number that causes the lower probability of sale, but inherent 
characteristics of the work that led to its placement later in the sale.     
 Furthermore, a high sale rate and average price of sale are indicative of sales that contain 
sought-after works, and thus attract a high number and caliber of eager buyers. Auction houses 
will naturally include higher quality and value prints in sales with other higher value works, 
therefore these works may have higher likelihood of sale and realized price because of their 
greater inherent value which led to their inclusion in more prestigious sales in the first place. 
However, as discussed in Section IV, this specific sample was chosen because their quality is 
believed to differ minimally. In addition, very little variation in auction catalogue descriptions of 
the physical condition of the prints was noted during the data collection phase.  The effects of 
potential endogeneity are further discussed in Section VII.  
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VI. Econometric Results 
 
 
Equation 1 
 The results for Equation 1 are found in Table 3. The coefficient of LotOrder is negative 
and significant at the 10% level, providing some evidence that having higher lot numbers not 
only decrease realized prices—as observed with the declining price anomaly—but also deceases 
the likelihood that a work sells. The regression results suggest that on average, the probability of 
sale is 22.8% less for Flowers prints that are the last lot offered as opposed to the first.  
 The coefficient of SaleRate is positive and significant at the 1% level, implying that the 
greater the ratio of works that sell, the more likely it is that the individual print sells. Relatedly, 
the coefficient of ln(AveragePrice) is positive and significant at the 10% level, providing 
evidence of spillover effects from important works that are included in a sale. The results suggest 
that a 1% increase in the average price of a sale increases the probability of sale by 5.3%.  
 The coefficient of ln(AverageEstimate) is negative and significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that a 1% increase in the average estimate decreases probability that the works sells 
by 16.9%. This result is contrary to a conception held by some in the industry that fine art is a 
Veblen good, for which demand is positively correlated with price. If this were true, setting 
higher estimates should attract a higher caliber of bidders and increase the likelihood of sale and 
realized prices.  
 The coefficient of Medium is positive and significant at the 10% level. The results imply 
that being auctioned by Bonhams or Phillips increases the probability of sale by 23.3%. The 
coefficient of Major is also positive, but of smaller magnitude and not significant. A possible 
explanation for the higher likelihood of sale at the medium auction houses is that Christie’s and 
Sotheby’s tend to focus on the higher end of the market and place less effort into pursing lower 
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value consignments, whereas Bonhams and Phillips focus precisely on those less valuable 
consignments or niche markets that the major houses pass over. In 2007, the average price of a 
work sold was $50,000 at Sotheby’s and $35,000 at Christie’s.24 Meanwhile, in 2006, the 
average price of a work sold across all other auction houses was just above $7,000. In the sample 
studied by this paper, the average price inclusive of buyer’s premium for a Flowers print is 
$24,078.70—putting these prints in the range of works targeted by medium auction houses. 
Therefore, it is possible that the medium houses place more marketing and sales effort into these 
works—such as giving them features in the catalogue—than do the major houses, where these 
works are less likely to be highlight items. This can be seen with the difference in lot order of the 
prints across the two auction houses. The average lot order is .655 for medium houses, and .911 
for major houses. Given the evidence for the declining price anomaly, and assuming the auction 
houses approximately structure their sales from high to low value works, it is clear that these 
prints are given more importance by medium auction houses than major ones. 
 Although insignificant, a number of the variables in this equation are of hypothesized 
signs. The coefficient of Emerging and Evening are positive, suggesting that realized prices are 
higher in emerging markets than tertiary ones, and for works included in evening sales than day 
sales.  
 
Equation 2 
 The results of Equation 2 are found in the first column of Table 4. The coefficient of  
ln(AveragePrice) is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that a 1% increase in the 
average price of the sale increases the realized price of the print by 0.119%. This result further 
                                                        
24 Thompson, 100. 
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corroborates the hypothesis that there exist spillover effects on price from the other works 
included in a sale. 
 The coefficient of the interaction of PeakMonth and Emerging is negative and significant 
at the 10% level, implying that prices in emerging markets during peak months are lower than 
prices in small markets in summer or winter months. However, while insignificant, the 
coefficients of Emerging and PeakMonth are both positive, suggesting that the hypothesized 
positive correlation between these variables and realized prices may still hold.  
 Although insignificant, the negative coefficient of LotOrder further corroborates the 
existence of the declining price anomaly in this sample. The positive coefficient of SaleRate also 
suggests that a higher sale rate for the total sale not only increases likelihood of sale, but also the 
realized prices of works that sold. Finally, the positive coefficient of Evening supports 
conventional wisdom that the prestige of evening sales helps increase realized prices.  
 
Equation 3 
 The results of Equation 3 are found in the second column of Table 4. As in Equation 2, 
the coefficient of ln(AveragePrice) is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that a 
1% increase in the average price of a sale is correlated with a 0.175% higher average pre-sale 
estimate. This result implies that auction houses take into account the value of other works in the 
sale when setting estimates for each specific work.  
 An interesting result is that the coefficients for both Medium and Major are negative and 
significant at a 5% and 1% level respectively. The results suggest that compared to small auction 
houses, average estimates are 17.6% lower at Bonhams and Phillips and 27.5% lower at 
Christie’s and Sotheby’s. It seems unlikely that estimates are set solely based on the inherent 
value of and demand for a work, as medium and major auction houses should be able to win 
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higher quality consignments for their sales, not lower ones. Instead, this result supports the 
conclusion that larger auction houses are more strategic at setting estimates than smaller 
houses—as seen in the first regression, the coefficient of ln(AverageEstimate) is negative and 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that lower estimates increase the likelihood of sale. 
Similar findings have been observed in the real estate market with the pricing strategy of 
experienced brokers and sellers.25  
The magnitude and significance of the results for the year dummy variables in Equations 
2 and 3 are consistent with art market trends in the last two decades (see Chart 1). The first 
observation, the reference year, occurred during a bubble in the market that lasted from 1989 to 
1990. All subsequent coefficients are negative until 1999. Since about 2006, the share of Warhol 
works in the total auction gross has grown significantly due to increased demand for Warhol, 
corresponding to higher prices and highly significant higher magnitude coefficients. In fact, 74% 
of the observations in this sample occur after 2005. 
In addition, the high R-square values for both Equations 2 and 3 are notable. The results 
suggest that over 80% of the variation in price for effectively identical prints can be explained by 
year-on-year market trends and differences in the auction environment, signifying that strategic 
decisions and negotiations made by sellers and auction houses may be highly impactful.  
 
Equation 4 
 The results of Equation 4 are found in Table 5. The result is positive and significant at the 
1% level and supports that auction estimates are highly correlated with realized hammer prices. 
                                                        
25 Benjamin, John, and Peter T. Chinloy. "Pricing, exposure and residential listing strategies." 
Journal of Real Estate Research 20.1 (2000): 61-74. 
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This sample also suggests overestimation by auction houses, as a 1% increase in the average 
estimate is associated with a 0.869% increase in the hammer price.  
 While this analysis would benefit from examining Equation 4 for each caliber of auction 
house in order to determine which houses set more accurate estimates, the limited number of 
observations for each led to insignificance.  Finally, although this result could signify that 
auction houses are accurate predictors of value and demand, the possibility of reverse causality 
exists, where buyers are credulous of estimates that are set strategically.  
 
 
VII. Potential Sources of Error 
 The largest source of error stems from the difficulty of obtaining data for the sample. The 
small sample size and large number of variables tested leads to insignificance for some of the 
variables. For example, no meaningful conclusions could be gathered from the variables 
representing the type of sale the work is included in—likely because the majority of works in the 
sample were included in prints sales. 
 Because the art market is relatively obscure and unregulated, information published by 
auction houses varies significantly. For auction houses located outside of the U.S., data obtained 
outside of ArtNet—primarily total sale sums—utilized foreign exchange rates from the day of 
the sale. Meanwhile, it is suspected the price data on prints obtained from ArtNet uses slightly 
different exchange rates, such as from the date the results were published or entered into the 
ArtNet system. While this error is assumed to be small, it nevertheless could impact final results 
due to the small nature of the sample. 
 In addition, whereas ArtNet provided the price inclusive of buyer’s premium, finding 
records of historical buyer’s premiums in order to determine the hammer price proved 
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challenging, especially for smaller auction houses. In some cases, buyer’s premiums were 
approximated based on industry standards at the time. This approximation could affect some of 
the data on hammer prices, and subsequently the results of Equation 4.  
 The use of the multiple imputation method naturally introduces the possibility of error 
into the data. However, this amount of error is assumed to be small, as the missing data is for the 
most part random and only about 9% of the data is imputed. Results obtained without the 
imputed data are greatly similar, without the higher levels of significance allowed for by more 
observations.  
 Finally, while this paper assumes that the majority of prints in the sample are 
homogenous and thus discounts potential issues of endogeneity, there lingers the possibility that 
some differences in the preservation and physical condition of the prints are not mentioned in 
presale reports or in auction catalogues. Because this cannot be observed in the data, this paper 
concludes that differences between auction houses’ estimates cannot be entirely attributed to 
differences in quality or condition. In reality, estimates are used by auction houses and buyers as 
a strong indicator of precisely these factors. Although the information may not be detailed in the 
catalogues, there could exist unobservable unique characteristics of the works that are captured 
by the auction estimate. 
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks and Areas for Further Research 
 The results of this study suggest that clear violations of the law of one price exist in the 
art auction industry, stemming from unique sale environments created by the auction experience. 
The most significant factors that increase the likelihood of sale for identical prints are a high rate 
of sale for the total auction, a relatively low presale estimate, a high average price for the total 
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sale, a low lot number, and being auctioned by Bonhams or Phillips. Aside from market trends, 
the most significant factor that increases the realized price of a work are a high average price for 
the total sale—indicative of spillover effects from other works included in the same sale. The 
results also suggest that on some level, auction houses set presale estimates strategically, based 
on factors aside from the inherent quality and condition of the work. The most important factors 
that auction houses take into account when setting estimates seem to be the value of other works 
included in the sale. Larger, more established houses are likely more strategic at setting 
estimates—valuing lower to increase the probability of sale.  All in all, presale estimates do 
prove significantly correlated with realized hammer prices. However, whether this is because 
auction houses are good predictors of value and demand, or if investors are credulous of 
estimates that take into account other factors remains unclear and beyond the scope of this paper. 
 A prudent seller would be wise to negotiate with medium auction houses for his or her 
work to be included in a sale with high valued and in-demand works, with an early lot 
placement, and relatively low presale estimate. 
 Due to the time constraints of this study, the sample was restricted only to Flowers prints. 
An interesting experiment for further study would be to perform the same empirical exercises on 
another set of prints, perhaps from a different artist or art historical style, in order to better be 
able to generalize these results for the market as a whole. Additionally, while the effects of 
provenance could not be studied for this sample, older prints, such as Old Master’s prints by 
artists like Albrecht Dûrer are more likely to have longer and more notable provenances—
making them more appropriate samples to examine this question.  
Access to a wide archive of auction catalogues would also allow for a closer examination 
of the effects of marketing undertaken by the auction house. For example, a variable indicating 
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whether the work received a full-page feature in the catalogue or was on the front cover could 
have been included in the equations modeled. Perhaps this would require limiting the sample to 
major auction houses for which such records exist. Finally, a rapidly growing market in the art 
industry is that of online sales. As smaller startups like Paddle8 and Artsy are seeing success 
auctioning work exclusively online, the major houses are also adjusting to meet this new 
demand. Christie’s is increasingly emphasizing online sales for jewelry and luxury items, while 
Sotheby’s very recently launched an online sales platform partnered with EBay. While the 
dynamics of online auctions are largely different from physical showroom sales, it would be 
interesting to see how the availability of an online market place impacts the sale of works—
especially less expensive, more commoditized works like prints.  
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Table 1: Summary of Variables 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Sold 212 .840 .368 0 1 
PricePremium 212 24078.7 17291.07 0 84450.19 
PriceHammer 212 19794.33 14160.09 0 67290.99 
LotOrder 202 .773 .276 .004 1 
SaleRate 192 .751 .134 .218 .993 
AverageEstimate 212 22492.35 11576.98 4000 84450 
AveragePrice 190 22690.63 34686.49 1613.703 354416 
PeakMonth 
 
212 .717 .452 0 1 
Medium 
 
212 .10 .30 0 1 
Major  212 .505 .501 0 1 
Prints  212 .613 .488 0 1 
IMC  212 .25 .434 0 1 
Emerging  212 .085 .279 0 1 
Traditional  212 .642 .481 0 1 
Evening  212 .080 .272 0 1 
Year1 (1989) 212 .024 .152 0 1 
Year2 (1992) 212 .009 .097 0 1 
Year3 (1993) 212 .009 .097 0 1 
Year4 (1994) 212 .014 .118 0 1 
Year5 (1996) 212 .028 .166 0 1 
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Year6 (1997) 212 .005 .069 0 1 
Year7 (1998) 212 .014 .118 0 1 
Year8 (1999) 212 .014 .118 0 1 
Year9 (2001) 212 .038 .191 0 1 
Year10 (2002) 212 .004 .069 0 1 
Year11 (2003) 212 .071 .257 0 1 
Year12 (2004) 212 .005 .069 0 1 
Year13 (2005) 212 .024 .152 0 1 
Year14 (2006) 212 .052 .222 0 1 
Year15 (2007) 212 .071 .257 0 1 
Year16 (2008) 212 .099 .299 0 1 
Year17 (2009) 212 .038 .191 0 1 
Year18 (2010) 212 .061 .240 0 1 
Year19 (2011) 212 .066 .245 0 1 
Year20 (2012) 212 .066 .245 0 1 
Year21 (2013) 212 .118 .323 0 1 
Year22 (2014) 212 .170 .376 0 1 
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Table 2: Summary of Results of Multiple Imputation  
 
m = 0 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
LotOrder 202 0.773 0.276 0.004 1 
SaleRate 192 0.751 0.134 0.218 0.993 
AveragePrice 190 22690.63 34686.49 1613.703 354416 
ln(AveragePrice) 190 9.660 0.808 7.386 12.778 
m = 1 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
LotOrder 212 0.772 0.275 0.004 1 
SaleRate 212 0.745 0.136 0.218 0.993 
AveragePrice 212 26203.07 46151.63 1613.703 354416 
ln(AveragePrice) 212 9.692 0.864 7.386 13.690 
m = 20 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
LotOrder 212 0.765 0.282 0.002 1 
SaleRate 212 0.744 0.140 0.218 0.993 
AveragePrice 212 26675.77 46020.93 480.018 354416 
Ln(AveragePrice) 212 9.687 0.856 7.386 12.778 
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Table 3: Results, Equation 1 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Logit Coeff Odds Ratio Average 
Marginal 
Effects 
    
Sold    
    
LotOrder -2.740* 0.0646* -0.228* 
 (1.523) (0.0984) (0.123) 
SaleRate 5.537*** 254.0*** 0.461*** 
 (2.028) (515.0) (0.159) 
ln(AveragePrice) 0.637* 1.891* 0.053* 
 (0.380) (0.719) (0.031) 
ln(AverageEstimate) -2.031*** 0.131*** -0.169*** 
 (0.650) (0.0852) (0.051) 
Medium 2.788* 16.25* 0.233* 
 (1.424) (23.14) (0.116) 
Major 1.145 3.143 0.096 
 (0.877) (2.756) (.072) 
Prints -1.407 0.245 -0.118 
 (1.352) (0.331) (0.113) 
IMC -0.467 0.627 -0.039 
 (0.987) (0.618) (0.082) 
Emerging 1.272 3.569 0.106 
 (1.425) (5.086) (0.118) 
Traditional -0.0289 0.971 -0.002 
 (1.137) (1.104) (0.095) 
Evening 0.382 1.466 0.032 
 (1.062) (1.556) (.089) 
PeakMonth -0.104 0.901 -0.009 
 (0.976) (0.879) (0.081) 
PeakMonth_Emerging -1.299 0.273 -0.108 
 (1.729) (0.472) (0.143) 
PeakMonth_Traditional 1.871 6.495 0.156 
 (1.307) (8.487) (0.108) 
Constant 13.71** 897,174** 2.640** 
 (6.317) (5.668e+06) (0.365) 
    
Observations 212 212 212 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Results, Equations 2 & 3 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ln(PricePremium) ln(AverageEstimate) 
   
LotOrder -0.197 -0.0256 
 (0.151) (0.133) 
SaleRate 0.264 0.318 
 (0.222) (0.193) 
ln(AveragePrice) 0.119*** 0.175*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0335) 
Medium -0.137 -0.176** 
 (0.0975) (0.0856) 
Major 0.0162 -0.275*** 
 (0.103) (0.0920) 
Prints 0.0228 0.173 
 (0.146) (0.128) 
IMC 0.115 0.0912 
 (0.107) (0.0901) 
Emerging 0.155 -0.125 
 (0.168) (0.151) 
Traditional 0.0137 0.000720 
 (0.143) (0.112) 
Evening 0.0947 0.0794 
 (0.117) (0.103) 
PeakMonth 0.122 0.0513 
 (0.134) (0.100) 
PeakMonth_Emerging -0.399* 0.0784 
 (0.220) (0.175) 
PeakMonth_Traditional -0.110 -0.0546 
 (0.157) (0.122) 
Year2 -0.687*** -0.0253 
 (0.257) (0.247) 
Year3 -0.555** -0.241 
 (0.249) (0.237) 
Year4 -0.602*** -0.612*** 
 (0.225) (0.212) 
Year5 -0.617*** -0.452*** 
 (0.187) (0.168) 
Year6 -0.724** -0.565* 
 (0.340) (0.337) 
Year7 -0.489** -0.218 
 (0.235) (0.213) 
Year8 -0.0930 -0.204 
 (0.215) (0.203) 
Year9 -0.325* -0.375** 
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 (0.168) (0.155) 
Year10 -0.148 -0.299 
 (0.312) (0.301) 
Year11 0.109 0.0844 
 (0.164) (0.147) 
Year12 0.248 -0.0973 
 (0.312) (0.301) 
Year13 0.440** 0.0894 
 (0.196) (0.183) 
Year14 0.815*** 0.582*** 
 (0.181) (0.165) 
Year15 1.096*** 0.674*** 
 (0.172) (0.156) 
Year16 0.922*** 1.212*** 
 (0.181) (0.158) 
Year17 0.443** 0.587*** 
 (0.201) (0.167) 
Year18 0.659*** 0.818*** 
 (0.183) (0.166) 
Year19 0.774*** 0.797*** 
 (0.180) (0.159) 
Year20 0.820*** 0.864*** 
 (0.172) (0.156) 
Year21 0.804*** 0.838*** 
 (0.166) (0.148) 
Year22 0.913*** 0.672*** 
 (0.168) (0.150) 
Constant 8.254*** 7.414*** 
 (0.428) (0.376) 
   
Observations 178 212 
R-square 0.849 0.831 
Adj. R-square 0.813 0.798 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Results, Equation 4 
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES ln(PriceHammer) 
  
ln(AverageEstimate) 0.869*** 
 (0.0394) 
Constant 1.377*** 
 (0.387) 
  
Observations 
R-square 
Adj. R-square 
178 
0.735 
0.733 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chart 1: Total Auction Gross by Artist
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